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Seeking to demonstrate that ‘our education system is a big waste of time and money’ (p.1), The Case 
Against Education presents a controversial argument that public funding for education at all levels 
should not only be reduced, but ceased altogether (with the exception of a means-tested voucher 
system at primary level) culminating in a ‘separation of school and state’ (p.6); bankruptcy of 
unprofitable educational institutions becomes an example of ‘market correction’ rather than ‘market 
failure’ (p.216) under this model. Authored by a libertarian economist and self-described ‘whistle-
blower’ (p.xiii), the book will surely be cat-nip to those conservatives who favour so-called ‘small 
government’ and its concomitant reduction in public spending. Not surprisingly, the book’s central 
thesis will also seem outrageous to those who view education as a kind of ‘public good’, rather than 
simply a means to a (well-paid) end. 
Caplan’s primary aim is to set forth a protracted case for understanding education as ‘signalling’ - that 
is, merely as a kind of tool that demonstrates what he describes as the intelligence, conscientiousness 
and conformity of graduates to potential employers: 
…despite the chasm between what students learn and what workers do, academic success is 
a strong signal of worker productivity. The labor market doesn’t pay you for the useless 
subjects you master; it pays you for the pre-existing traits you reveal by mastering them. (p.13) 
From the outset, Caplan positions himself against what he describes as ‘human capital puritanism’ 
(but without engaging directly with the proponents of this approach), and attempts to convince the 
reader that the vast bulk of education does not teach useful skills for employment; instead, employers 
seek highly educated employees because their education sends the right kinds of ‘signals’ about their 
productivity and, thus, suitability for employment. For academic readers familiar with Bourdieusian 
analyses of education, the powerful, symbolic aspect of educational credentials is hard to refute; yet 
while Caplan is engaged in a process of critique himself, far from dismantling the elitism inherent in 
educational systems that reproduce privilege (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990), his argument appears to 
re-entrench social divisions.  
Attempts by Caplan to quantify the proportion of ‘educational returns’ down to mere signalling - 
estimated by him at 80% (p.192) - are based on guesswork ‘because candor trumps caution’ (ibid.): 
Crunching numbers on the return to education is not like measuring Planck’s constant. All our 
calculations require guesswork, yielding averages or “expected values”, not precise 
predications. But don’t be alarmed. Whenever possible, guesswork builds on canonical data 
and careful academic research. (ibid.) 
What follows throughout the book is a rather curious methodological mix: dogged attempts to 
quantify the often un-measurable, are presented alongside anecdotal material, and the cherry-picking 
of data and existing studies to help lend credence to Caplan’s political philosophy (although, in all 
fairness, Caplan would hardly be alone in this regard). 
From Chapter 1, Caplan foregrounds his instrumental view of the purpose of education, insisting that 
the ‘humanistic benefits of education are mostly wishful thinking’ (p.6), and so his ranking of subjects 
into high, medium and low ‘usefulness’ in Chapter 2 is based purely on their perceived utility to the 
labour market as opposed to, say, participation in society and citizenship: ‘These ratings are my 
2 
 
personal judgment drawing on forty years in school’ (p.32); not surprisingly given his understanding  
of the purpose of education, Caplan deems foreign languages, arts, history and social sciences to be 
of ‘low usefulness’:  
How do you know Latin, trigonometry, or Emily Dickinson won’t serve you on the job? A man 
told me his French once helped him understand an airport announcement in Paris. Without 
high school French, he would have missed his flight. Invest years now and one day you might 
save hours at the airport. See, studying French pays!’ (p.38) 
Predictably monikered ‘Mickey mouse’ subjects are later dismissed as ‘unpaid chaff’ (p.79), and Caplan 
ultimately advocates closing ‘impractical departments at public colleges, and mak[ing] impractical 
majors at private colleges ineligible for government grants and loans. […] If students refuse to stay in 
school unless they’re allowed to waste public money, taxpayers should call their bluff’ (p.206). 
His analogy of amassing knowledge with ‘hoarding trash’ (p.38) best sums up his attitude to the type 
of ‘learning for learning’s sake’ so often championed by those involved in teaching, and this leads 
neatly into an examination of the effects of education on earnings, which seeks to challenge received 
wisdom on the subject by interrogating ‘ability bias’. Caplan’s argument rests on the belief that since 
education is predominantly ‘signalling’ (and does not teach useful skills for later employment), then 
the higher salaries graduates can expect to command compared to their uneducated peers is reflective 
of their natural ability.  
This is where, I believe, the most troubling of Caplan’s assertions begins to emerge: it quickly becomes 
apparent during the course of the book that ideas about who is educable are underpinned by notions 
of hereditary ability (p.75), while the social context in which notions of ‘ability’ are constructed and 
the factors which then determine whether young people are deemed ‘able’ are neglected. For those 
readers interested in cultural economy, Caplan’s biological determinism will be highly problematic. 
For example, Caplan states: ‘Imperfect though they are, IQ tests are a good-faith effort to measure 
how smart people are, and predict success inside and outside the classroom’ (p.73) - an attitude which 
fails to take into consideration the well-documented influence of ‘race’ and other social factors on IQ 
test performance (see, for example, Mendoza et al. 2016). ‘Drop-outs’ are dismissed as ‘precocious 
troublemakers’ with ‘low IQs and poor grades’ (p.177), and in his discussion of the effects of education 
on crime, the ‘criminal personality’ is strangely reified as Caplan proclaims: ‘Future criminals, like 
future dropouts, are impulsive, aggressive, and defiant – and act accordingly’ (p.177); not surprisingly, 
then, there is no awareness of the social construction of criminality, or of the ‘prison industrial 
complex’ (see, for example, Davis 2003).  
As happens repeatedly throughout the book, however, Caplan tries to head-off any objections to his 
approach:  
My counsel rubs many the wrong way. Some dismiss it as “elitist,” “philistine,” or “sexist.” The 
correct label is candid. It’d not my fault education’s rewards hinge on graduation. It’s not my 
fault fine arts degrees pay poorly. It’s not my fault married women profit far more from 
education than single women. It’s not my fault so many graduates don’t work full time. I am 
only the messenger. My job is to honestly report the facts, especially unwelcome facts of great 
practical importance. (p.161) 
Yet, aside from displaying what many social scientists will find to be deeply unpalatable attitudes 
towards groups who have historically - and continue today to be socially -  marginalised and 
discriminated against, Caplan’s presentation of material is also misleading: arguments influenced by 
behavioural genetics are presented as indisputable ‘fact’, and the highly contested nature of this field 
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of study (see Panofsky 2014) remains unacknowledged:  ‘The genes your parents give you at 
conception have a much larger effect on your success than all the advantages your parents give you 
after conception’ (p.181). 
Such an understanding, then, helps to explain Caplan’s view on working-class participation in higher 
education: concerned with the effects of ‘credential inflation’ and advocating for ‘assign[ing] dollar 
values to everything you care about’ (p.164) when faced with educational choices, he argues that 
‘Poor Students should not go to college, period’ (p.161) – an analysis that pivots on calculating 
educational returns, rather than attempting to capture the transformative potential in the process 
itself (see, for example, Loveday 2015). For Caplan, ‘the root problem with education is not too little 
access but too much attendance’ (p.211) and the raising of tuition fees is seen as one way in which 
students can be deterred from embarking on a university education (p.209) -  a conclusion that does 
not seem to have been borne out in the medium-term within the UK context after a substantial hike 
in the costs of tuition from 2012 (see Bolton 2018, pp. 13-14). Since Caplan’s thesis is built on a 
conceptualization of education as ‘signalling’ – and his analysis of the costs and benefits of education 
throughout the book are calculated in purely monetary terms – it is unsurprising that the crux of his 
argument is: 
To be maximally blunt, we would be better off if education were less affordable. If subsidies 
for education were drastically reduced, many could no longer afford the education they now 
plan to get. If I am correct, however, this is no cause for alarm. It is precisely because education 
is so affordable that the labor market expects us to possess so much. Without the subsidies, 
you would no longer need the education you can no longer afford. (p.6) 
Caplan’s position appears woefully naïve: undoubtedly, society’s most privileged will continue 
undeterred to marshal their resources into ensuring their children receive expensive, elite educations, 
and so measures to reduce the affordability of education serve to re-embed existing divisions; it is 
unclear how long Caplan believes it will take for the labour market to adapt so employees ‘no longer 
need the education [they] can no longer afford’. Caplan does, however, attempt to discuss alternatives 
to a university education, although his advocacy of child labour (from what age exactly is unclear) 
seems deliberately provocative: since students are not paid to go to school, he asks ‘why hold firms 
to a higher standard?’ (p.231); in line with his libertarian position, he advocates for ‘deregulat[ion] 
and destigmatiz[ation]’ and ‘parental oversight’ (p.233): ‘Before using taxpayer dollars to jumpstart 
apprenticeships, government should get out of the way and take stock of all opportunities the labor 
market provides’ (ibid.). Caplan’s assessment of the potential of vocational education to provide 
tangible skills would seem like a much more reasonable proposition, yet - once again - working-class 
students are referred to as ‘crime-prone’ (p.229) and the possibility of gaining new skills is simply 
framed in terms of productivity, rather than a more thorough ‘re-valorizing of vocational and working-
class knowledges’ as Diane Reay (2012, p.592) has urged. 
Towards the end of the book, Caplan attempts to confront the less tangible – and potentially 
transformative - aspects of learning, seeking to respond to ‘anyone who defends actually existing 
education as good for the soul’ (p.242).  His response to the ‘humanist critique’ (p.238) of economistic 
understandings of the purpose of education involves an examination of ‘worthy content’, ‘skilful 
pedagogy’, and ‘eager students’ – all of which he contends would make education a ‘merit good’ 
(p.240), but which he predictably finds to be lacking. Without having himself conducted empirical 
research in educational contexts, and with students’ voices noticeably absent from the book (aside 
from the fictionalised characters presented in the imagined scenarios in the final substantive chapter), 
the reader comes away with no feel for how students make sense of their own participation in 
education – that is, apart from Caplan’s own educational experiences:  
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Autobiographically, my doubts about the social value of education long predated my discovery 
of political philosophy. What undermined my faith? Firsthand experience. Soon after starting 
kindergarten, I started to realize, in a childish way, that I’d never use most of the material my 
teachers taught (p.217-218). 
Much can be said – and has, indeed, already been written – on the flaws inherent in both the UK and 
US educational systems; in this sense, Caplan’s critique is one amongst many. Yet it is the 
presumptions on which the scaffold of his argument is constructed that lead to the fundamentally 
flawed conclusion that ‘education in grossly over-rated’ (p.285). Caplan presents himself as a lone 
pioneer facing off against a ‘megachorus’ (p.289) crying out for educational reform: ‘Once you calmly 
review your experience through my lens, I bet you’ll admit I’ve got a point’ (p.6). Yet far from being 
persuaded by Caplan’s thesis after finishing the book, I found myself even more convinced as to the 
value of education as a public good and the need to work towards meaningful reform, particularly 
with regards to the democratisation and ‘de-colonisation’ of higher education (see for example Santos 
2017); this is – no doubt – in part because of my own background, educational journey and positioning 
within the university. The book is aimed at a general, non-specialist readership, and so it is precisely 
the presentation of Caplan’s argument through his own lens – that is, from the authoritative 
perspective of a white, male university professor who describes his father as having had a PhD in 
electrical engineering and who notes in the dedication to the book that his own children are home-
schooled – that matters here; as Patricia Hill Collins (2000, p. 252) notes, ‘Epistemological choices 
about whom to trust, what to believe, and why something is true are not benign academic issues’. If 
we choose to look at the education system from Caplan’s perspective and trust his presentation of 
findings, then we also run the risk of endorsing a set of assumptions not only about the functioning of 
the education system itself – as contested a domain as any - but about the nature of who is educable.  
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